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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND RECOMMENDATION 
FI LED 
AUG 2 5 2017 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the above-
entitled matter to Referee Brian Harper, who conducted a hearing in Boise, Idaho, 
on February 22, 2017. 1 W. Breck Seiniger of Boise represented Claimant. R. Daniel Bowen 
of Boise represented Defendants. The parties submitted oral and documentary evidence 
at hearing and submitted post-hearing briefs. No post-hearing depositions were taken. 
The matter came under advisement on June 6, 2017. 
1 This is the second hearing in this matter. The first was held by Referee Just on December 7, 2011, and dealt 
with the limited issue of whether Claimant was entitled to a certain prosthetic appliance for his right hand 
finger amputations. The findings from that hearing, published in November 2012, are discussed herein 
to the extent necessary, and incorporated by reference as if set forth in whole. 
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/'16 
ISSUES 
The issues to be decided are: 
1. Whether and to what extent Claimant 1s entitled to retraining 
reimbursement benefits; 
2. Whether Claimant 1s entitled to temporary disability benefits while m 
the period of retraining; 
3. Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to disability benefits; and 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 72-804. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Claimant asserts that he suffered a 75% permanent partial disability as a result of his 
subject industrial injury, without factoring in mitigation of such disability resulting from 
Claimant's self-financed "retraining" 2 as a pharmacy tech. If Claimant's post-high school 
training and education are considered, his disability is reduced to 55% permanent 
partial disability. Because Claimant's post secondary education was a significant factor 
in reducing his permanent disability from 75% to 55%, Defendants should be required to pay for 
52 weeks of such "retraining" in addition to benefits for Claimant's permanent partial 
disability of 55%. Since Claimant did not work while "retraining" he is entitled to 52 weeks 
of TTD benefits. If Defendants are not obligated to pay for Claimant's "retraining" they should 
be required to pay permanent partial disability benefits for Claimant's permanent disability 
2 
The Referee, but not the Claimant, uses quotation marks around the word retraining, since the undersigned cannot 
legitimately call Claimant's post-secondary education retraining. Retraining implies Claimant was previously 
trained in some career, and had to be retrained, i.e. trained again, due to the accident in question. Technically, while 
Claimant obtained work-skill training post-accident, he did not receive retraining in the popular sense of the word. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 2 
as of the date ofMMI, to wit, at the rate of 75% PPD. 
Defendants argue that Claimant, who suffered his mJury while still in high school, 
is not entitled to retroactive reimbursement of his post-secondary education and training 
under the guise of retraining benefits. To his credit, Claimant "thrived" after his 
industrial accident, acquiring skills, training, and education which allowed him to obtain 
gainful employment. He suffered no permanent disability in excess of his 32% whole 
person impairment. Claimant is not entitled to retraining, TTD, and/or PPD benefits. 
Defendants are not liable for attorney fees. 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in this matter consists of the following: 
1. The testimony of Claimant and Douglas Crum taken at hearing; 
2. Claimant's exhibits 1 through 10, 12, and 14 through 16 admitted at hearing;3 
3. Defendants' exhibits 1 and 2, admitted at hearing; 
4. The Industrial Commission file and record m this matter, including 
the exhibits admitted at the first hearing. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
RELEVANT PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED FINDINGS 
As footnoted above, Referee Just conducted a prev10us hearing m this matter, 
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law flowed therefrom. Those facts 
and legal conclusions are binding, and serve as a framework herein. While all such facts and 
legal conclusions are incorporated herein by reference, certain facts and conclusions 
3 
Claimant's Exhibit 11 was withdrawn at hearing; 13 was not admitted due a sustained objection to its admission, 
and Exhibits 14, 15, and 16 were offered and admitted during the course of the hearing. 
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are reiterated, summarized, and/or paraphrased herein to provide clarity. Additional facts 
from the 2017 proceedings are also included as required to support the conclusions. 
1. At the time of the 2011 hearing, Claimant was twenty-one years of age. 
2. At the time of his industrial accident, July 30, 2008, Claimant had not yet 
graduated from high school. In addition to his high school studies, Claimant worked part-time 
in a fast-food restaurant, earning between $7.00 and $7.50 per hour. 
3. During his summer vacation in 2008, Claimant started a temporary summer job 
at Rule Steel Tanks, Inc., where his father also worked. His rate of pay was $7.00 per hour. 
Claimant's job was operating a metal press that shaped pieces of steel. On Claimant's 
second day of work, he caught the fingers of his dominant right hand in the metal press, 
resulting in a traumatic amputation of portions of all four fingers on his dominant hand, 
associated crush injuries, and some degloving injuries on what remained of his fingers. 
4. Claimant's severed fingertips were not replantable because of significant 
soft tissue and bone damage in the residual fingers. 
5. Following several surgeries, Claimant emerged with a right hand that includes 
an uninjured thumb, and portions of each of his four fingers. 4 
6. By April 6, 2009, Claimant was medically stable. Claimant received 
an impairment rating of 32% whole person, with permanent restrictions related to the use 
of his right hand. 
4 
For a finger-by-finger description of the Joss, see the November 12, 2012 Findings of Fact. 
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POST-2011 FINDINGS 
7. Claimant obtained a GED in 2009, after missing too much school due to his injury 
to graduate with his classmates. From there, Claimant attended Lewis-Clark State College 
in Lewiston for an academic year. He then attended College of Western Idaho ( online) 
briefly in the summer of 2010. He dropped his class at CWI after about three weeks. 
8. Claimant, both before and briefly after the accident in question worked part time 
at a local Dairy Queen, but beginning in the summer of 2011 he gained employment at WDS, 
which was a Verizon call center. He worked there through that November. His job duties 
included assisting customers with billing issues. He used a computer and phone set extensively. 
Claimant became unemployed in December 2011. Thereafter, he unsuccessfully sought work 
at numerous banks for a teller position, at call centers, and for jobs operating machines. 
9. Claimant discussed a career as a pharmacy technician (PT) with relatives 
· and concluded he should pursue that option. He began a course of study leading to a PT 
certificate at Carrington College in the fall semester of 2012. Soon after enrolling there, 
he discovered he could obtain his PT certificate from the Milan Institute for less money, 
and the Institute was much closer to his home. Claimant quit Carrington College and enrolled 
at Milan Institute to complete his ten-month training course. 
10. Claimant's PT program required him to complete a one-month unpaid 
pharmacy internship, which he accomplished in May 2013, and received his PT certificate 
thereafter. Claimant financed his PT education with a grant, student loans, and financial help 
from his parents. 
11. Claimant was not employed or working for mcome during the time he 
was undergoing his PT training. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 5 
12. About two months after obtaining his PT certificate, Claimant found work at 
Terry Reilly Pharmacy in Nampa as a PT. His starting salary was $11.80 per hour,5 
with paid medical, vision, and dental benefits after two months. Claimant worked for 
Terry Reilly Pharmacy for two years. 
13. Next, Claimant went to work for Tiger Direct doing telephone sales. That job paid 
$14.50 per hour. Claimant went into this employment knowing it would not be his career job. 
TigerDirect was bought out, and Claimant lost his job there. 
14. After applying at numerous pharmacies and banks, Claimant found a job working 
as a teller at KeyBank. He worked there from February 2016 through September of that year. 
His rate of pay was $11.50 per hour. He was released after a customer filed a complaint 
against him. 
15. In December 2016, Claimant found employment with Albertsons Pharmacy's 
corporate offices in Boise. He works as a third-party coordinator, whereby he processes claims 
for pharmacies when there are issues at the point of purchase. Claimant continued to be 
employed in this position at the time of hearing. His hourly wage is $15.87 plus health, dental, 
vision, and 401(k) benefits after three months. Claimant enjoys working there and plans on 
staying with Albertsons long term if possible. After one year of employment, there are multiple 
opportunities for advancement with the company. 
16. Claimant's job at Albertsons requires a pharmacy tech license (which Claimant 
possesses), and call center experience is desired, as is prior experience working with insurance 
companies and Medicare/Medicaid. Claimant had experience in all these categories when hired. 
5 At hearing, Claimant indicated he started at $12.80, but at his 2013 deposition (DE 1), taken a month after starting 
employment at Terry Reilly, Claimant testified he was making $11.80. The Referee finds Claimant's 2013 
testimony is more accurate as to his starting salary. 
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DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
In this proceeding, Claimant asks the Commission to order Defendants to reimburse him 
for a portion of his post-secondary education, which he deems to be "retraining." He also seeks 
benefits for his permanent partial disability. The twist presented herein is Claimant's argument 
that if Defendants are not obligated to pay for his training, then Claimant's disability should be 
analyzed as of the date Claimant reached MMI, with no consideration of his subsequent training 
and experience. Claimant acknowledges that by the time of hearing his disability rating was 
reduced due to his post-secondary education, training, and experience. However, Claimant 
argues that since Defendants did not pay for such education, they should not get the benefit of 
Claimant showing initiative and bettering his employment situation after his accident. 
RETRAINING AND ASSOC/A TED TTD BENEFITS 
17. Idaho Code § 72-450 provides, in pertinent part: 
... [I]f the commission deems a permanently disabled employee, after the 
period of recovery, is receptive to and in need of retraining in another field, 
skill or vocation in order to restore his earning capacity, the commission 
may authorize or order such retraining and during the period of retraining or 
any extension thereof, the employer shall continue to pay the disabled 
employee, as a subsistence benefit, temporary total or temporary partial 
disability benefits as the case my be. The period of retraining shall be fixed 
by the commission but shall not exceed fifty-two (52) weeks unless the 
commission, following application and hearing, deems it advisable to extend 
the period of retraining, in which case the increased period shall not exceed 
fifty-two (52) weeks. 
18. Breaking Idaho Code § 72-450 into its component parts, the following are points 
to be considered: 
(1) The Commission has discretion (but not a statutory obligation) to authorize or 
order retraining benefits when; 
(A) Claimant is permanently disabled after reaching MMI, and 
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;Jo/ 
(B) Claimant is receptive to retraining into a different field, skill, or 
vocation than the Claimant previously held, and 
(C) The retraining 1s designed to restore Claimant's 
earning capacity. 
(2) When retraining is authorized or ordered, the retraining benefits will not exceed 
52 weeks, unless after hearing the Commission deems it advisable to extend the period 
of retraining for up to an additional 52 weeks. 
19. Applying the technical phrasing of Idaho Code § 72-450 to the instant case, 
it appears Claimant does not meet all the criteria for application of the statute. While Claimant 
is undeniably permanently disabled, well beyond his date of medical stability, and was 
receptive to training, the remainder of the statute is less clear. 
20. For starters, Claimant did not have an established "field, skill, or vocation" 
at the time of his accident from which he was thereafter precluded due to his injuries. Arguably, 
Claimant's time-of-injury skills centered on working for fast food establishments while going 
to school. After the accident, he returned to the fast food industry, at least temporarily. Thus 
he proved he could still pursue those skills required to work at a fast food restaurant. His one-
plus day's experience at Rule Steel did not imbue Claimant with skills, was not his chosen field, 
and was never considered by him to be a place where he intended to pursue his vocation. 
Instead, both pre- and post-accident, Claimant had aspirations to attend college after high school. 
Claimant's fulfilled desire of attending institutions of higher learning after high school hardly fits 
the common definition of "retraining into a different field, skill, or vocation." 
21. The next issue confronting Claimant as regards the language of the statute 
in question is the fact that he did not need retraining in order to restore his previous 
earning capacity. At the time of his accident, Claimant had a minimum wage earning capacity. 
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Had he not been injured, there is no proof Claimant, without further education, would have likely 
started his post-high school career at anything other than a low to minimum wage job. 
While his further education certainly enhanced his earning ability, Claimant's earning capacity 
was not seriously undermined by his industrial accident, as admitted by Claimant's 
vocational rehabilitation expert. 
22. Juxtaposed against the technical reading of Idaho Code § 72-450, with its 
prerequisites and limitations, is the time-honored axiom that "[t]he provisions of the Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally construed in favor of the employee." 
Haldimanv. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793 P.2d 187, 188 (1990). 
"The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical construction." 
Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). While this language is often 
thrown into opinions without any real purpose or application to the particular facts in question, 
in this case a chief issue to be decided rests upon the application of this concept. 
23. There are several arguments in favor of allowing reimbursement of some of 
Claimant's post-high school education, even though his situation clearly does not align with 
the four comers of the statutory language. The objective of the statute seems to include giving 
an injured worker an opportunity to re-enter the workforce when the only thing preventing re-
entry is the worker's lack of training in a skill the worker can perform even with whatever 
permanent disabilities prevent him or her from returning to their time-of-injury employment. 
24. In the present case, Claimant was at a cross roads when confronted with his post-
injury permanent disability and no real work skills. He could have lamented his condition, 
maximized his perceived disabilities and focused on what he could not do. Conversely, Claimant 
could have resolved to not let his injury define him. Faced with these alternatives, 
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Claimant chose to discover his capabilities, adapt to his situation, further his education, 
and strive to make a life for himself and his new family. In the process, he incurred 
substantial educational expenses. 
25. Defendants concede that Claimant overcame his obstacles, gained a useful 
education, obtained work, and started what hopefully will be a successful career. However, 
they argue that Claimant did exactly what he wanted to do even before his accident - get college 
training and transition that education into a career. Defendants should not be required to pay for 
Claimant's education when it was not pursued as an alternative to what he would have done but 
for his injuries. Defendants' obligation is defined statutorily, not charitably or equitably. 
26. While both positions on this issue have merit, and while the liberal construction 
of the Act should not automatically preclude reimbursement of training expenses in this 
unique situation, nevertheless it appears Claimant's post-secondary education was not directed 
by his injury. Claimant had a vision of continuing his education after high school even before 
his accident. There is nothing in the record to establish that "but for" the accident, 
Claimant would have chosen a different path after high school. To his credit, Claimant did not 
abandon his pre-accident goals because of his permanent disability, but rather found a way to 
achieve them in spite of his disability. Unfortunately, within the parameters of the Act, there is 
no provision for rewarding individuals like Claimant who pull themselves up after a life-
changing accident. To require Defendants to pay for schooling that was part of Claimant's pre-
injury planning even without the accident is not proper. 
27. Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to retraining benefits for his post-
secondary education. 
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28. Since Claimant is not entitled to benefits under Idaho Code § 72-450, he is also 
not entitled to temporary disability benefits as contemplated by the statute for the time 
he attended college. 
PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY (PPD) 
29. Permanent disability results when the actual or presumed ability to engage in 
gainful activity is reduced or absent because of permanent impairment and no fundamental 
or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected. Idaho Code § 72-423. 
Evaluation (rating) of permanent disability is an appraisal of the injured employee's 
present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by 
the medical factor of impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors provided in 
Idaho Code § 72-430. Idaho Code § 72-425. Idaho Code § 72-430(1) provides that 
in determining percentages of permanent disabilities, account should be taken of the nature 
of the physical disablement, the disfigurement if of a kind likely to handicap the employee 
in procuring or holding employment, the cumulative effect of multiple mJunes, 
the occupation of the employee, and his or her age at the time of the accident 
causing the injury, consideration being given to the diminished ability of the affected 
employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical area 
considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee, and other factors 
as the Commission may deem relevant. The test for determining whether Claimant 
has suffered a permanent disability greater than permanent impairment 1s "whether 
the physical impairment, taken in conjunction with nonmedical factors, has reduced 
[the claimant's] capacity for gainful employment." Graybill v. Swift & Company, 
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115 Idaho 293, 294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 (1988). Claimant bears the burden of establishing 
his claim for permanent disability benefits. 
30. Claimant hired Douglas Crum, a local vocational rehabilitation consultant, 
to conduct a vocational assessment and render an opinion as to Claimant's permanent disability 
in light of his medical and non-medical factors. He prepared two reports and gave live 
hearing testimony. 
31. In his first report, dated November 16, 2009, Mr. Crum noted that before 
the accident Claimant was in very good health with no pre-existing physical limitations. 
Claimant was capable of performing medium and heavy physical-demand jobs. The limitations 
placed on Claimant post-accident eliminated his ability to perform heavy physical-demand jobs. 
32. Mr. Crum felt that Claimant, pre-injury, had access to 7.3% of the jobs in his 
labor market of Ada and Canyon counties. Mr. Crum opined that post-accident, and without 
training, Claimant had access to only 1.4% of the jobs in his labor market. 
33. Regarding wage loss, Mr. Crum felt that although Claimant had a history 
of minimum wage work, it would not be fair to use that as his wage baseline, since those jobs 
were temporary and/or summer work. But for the accident, Claimant would have had 
the capacity to eventually earn significantly more than minimum wage. However, Mr. Crum felt 
that without additional education, post-accident, Claimant would be relegated to low to minimum 
wage jobs indefinitely. Mr. Crum cited to statistics from Minnesota State Department of Health 
which concluded that disabled individuals were three times more likely to live below the poverty 
line than non-disabled individuals, earn nearly 23% less, and were more than twice as likely to 
be unemployed. Given these statistics, Mr. Crum felt it was imperative for Claimant to obtain 
further education beyond high school. 
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34. Mr. Crum believed that Claimant was unable to perform not only his time-of-
injury job, but also "most other jobs he could reasonably perform" before his injury. CE 1, p. 7. 
As such, Mr. Crum assigned Claimant an 80% loss of labor market rating. Mr. Crum did not 
assign Claimant a significant wage loss component. 
35. Mr. Crum concluded that without "retraining" Claimant would experience PPD 
in the range of 75% inclusive of his 32% PPL 
36. Mr. Crum prepared a second report on April 7, 2016. By then Claimant had 
undergone a functional capacity evaluation, which placed Claimant in the medium duty category. 
He had also completed his schooling at Milan Institute, and obtained his 
pharmacy tech certificate. 
37. In reviewing Claimant's wage history after high school, Mr. Crum noted 
Claimant had held several jobs significantly in excess of minimum wage. 
38. Due to Claimant's additional on-the-job training, and education culminating in 
a pharmacy tech certificate, Claimant's then-current market access loss was reduced from 
his prior estimate of 80% to 55%. Given Claimant's significant wage increases since 
his high school jobs, Mr. Crum felt that when wages are factored in, Claimant's PPD inclusive 
of his impairment, was 45%. 
39. Defendants retained, but did not utilize, a vocational rehabilitation expert. 
Instead Defendants rely on the record to support their theory that Claimant has suffered no PPD 
in excess of PPL They note that Claimant was released to his time-of-injury job in 2009, 
has since held several jobs which paid more than he was making at the time of his injury, 
including jobs at a call center and a bank, for which Claimant had no prior training. 
Claimant did what many high school graduates do - continued his education, got several jobs 
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which increased his pool of experience and better defined his vocational interests, and taught him 
how to interact with people in a business setting and on the phone. Outside of work, 
Claimant returned to his pre-injury activities including soccer, basketball, and working out 
at the gym. He had no trouble obtaining employment over the years since high school. 
Summing up Defendants' position, they noted "Claimant has a visible deformity but functional 
use of his right hand. He demonstrated the ability to return to the labor market and obtain 
and maintain employment. . . . As such, Claimant has not demonstrated that he suffered 
a disability in excess of his impairment." Ds' Brief, p. 16. 
40. Defendants are also critical of Mr. Crum's opinions. They note that he inflated 
Claimant's potential job market by including jobs for which Claimant had never expressed 
an interest or aptitude in pursuing, and also by including skilled labor positions such as 
carpentry, or welding; jobs for which Claimant had no background, training, or interest. 
They note that even without his injury, those skilled labor positions were not jobs which 
Claimant could perform. Furthermore, Claimant's visible deformation of his right hand has not 
kept him from obtaining employment as needed, and any argument that employers would be 
reluctant to hire him due to his "problem" hand has been proven inaccurate. 
Permanent Partial Disability Analysis 
41. Analysis of PPD in this case must start with a mistaken assertion raised 
at multiple points in Claimant's briefing. He argues that because Mr. Crum's testimony, 
including his opinions, are unrebutted and not inherently improbable, they must be taken as true. 
Citing to Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 447, 448, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937), 
Claimant argues that the undersigned may not "arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the testimony 
of a witness unimpeached by any of the modes known to the law, if such testimony does not 
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exceed probability." He also notes that "evidence, uncontradicted, must be accepted as true." 
Swanson v. State, 114 Idaho 607,609, 759 P. 898,900 (1998). 
42. The undersigned accepts Mr. Crum's factual testimony as true. However, 
expert opinions are not facts, and do not need to be accepted even if uncontradicted. 
"The opinion of an expert is not binding on the trial court, and, as long as it does not 
act arbitrarily, the trial court may reject expert testimony even when it is uncontradicted." 
Miller v. Cal/ear, 140 Idaho 213, 218, 91 P.3d 1117, 1122 (2004). Furthermore, "[t]he opinions 
of an expert are not binding upon the trier of fact, but are advisory only." Clark v. Truss, 
142 Idaho 404,408, 128 P.3d 941, 945 (2006). Finally, specifically with regard to PPD analysis, 
the Commission considers all relevant medical and nonmedical factors and evaluates 
the purely advisory opinions of vocational experts. See Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 
136 Idaho 733, 40 P.3d 91 (2002); Boley v. State, Industrial Special lndem. Fund, 
130 Idaho 278, 939 P.2d 854 (1997). (Emphasis added.) 
43. The next issue to resolve 1s the appropriate time for assessing 
Claimant's permanent physical disability. Claimant argues it would be patently unfair to allow 
Defendants to sit idly by while Claimant, at his own expense, obtained the post-secondary 
education he needed to succeed in his employment, thus driving down his PPD rating, only to 
swoop in and use that additional education as a sword to slash Claimant's PPD benefits. 
Claimant argues that if Defendants are not required to reimburse Claimant for his 
"retraining" expenses, they should not get the benefit of relying on his decreased PPD rating 
springing therefrom. Since Defendants do not have to reimburse Claimant for his educational 
expenses, Claimant asserts the undersigned should evaluate Claimant's PPD at the time of MMI. 
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44. Defendants meet this argument with a shrug. They argue that with or without 
the additional schooling, Claimant can not prove PPD in excess of his 32% PPL 
45. The Idaho Supreme Court in Brown v. The Home Depot, 152 Idaho 605, 
272 P.3d 577 (2012), held that, as a general rule, Claimant's disability assessment should be 
performed as of the date of hearing. Under Idaho Code§ 72-425, a permanent disability rating is 
a measure of the injured worker's "present and probable future ability to engage in 
gainful activity." Therefore, the Court reasoned, in order to assess the injured worker's 
"present" ability to engage in gainful activity, it necessarily follows that the labor market, 
as it exists at the time of hearing, is the labor market which must be considered. 
46. Permanent disability is a measure of present and future ability to engage in 
gainful activity. The record divulges no reason why Claimant's present and future ability 
to engage in gainful activity would be more accurately measured at any time other than 
the date of the hearing. Claimant's "equitable" argument, while enticing, does not advance 
the proper analysis considerations. At the time Claimant reached MMI he was still a "work in 
progress" with regard to his ability to engage in gainful employment. By his own admission, 
he intended, accident or not, to further his education after high school. It was never 
his intention to forgo further education and enter the work force upon high school graduation. 
To judge his ability to obtain and hold employment at a point in time when he was not seeking 
to enter the workforce on a career basis, makes no legal sense. 
Claimant's disability will be determined as of the hearing date. 
Therefore, 
47. Mr. Crum's opm10ns are of little advisory benefit m evaluating 
Claimant's PPD. To begin with, his reports and live testimony do not provide even a sample 
of the job categories which supposedly Claimant is now precluded from obtaining 
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due to his injury. Mr. Crum testified he did not consider jobs such as medical doctors and 
lawyers when calculating Claimant's loss of potential jobs, but his reports do not list 
the categories of jobs included. While there was argument that skilled labor jobs 
were included, it is not self-evident where this information may be found. Such information 
is not contained in Mr. Crum's reports or in his testimony. 
48. Apart from being conclusory in nature, history has shown Mr. Crum's first report 
to be incorrect. The implication of the Minnesota study was that Claimant would have 
a difficult time finding employment, making more than minimum wage, and escaping poverty. 
In reality, he has always been able to find a job within a reasonable time, found employment 
for jobs greater than minimum wage, and now has a job with Albertsons which is very much 
a career opportunity. Even before any additional education, Claimant returned to working 
at fast food jobs (which Mr. Crum's report indicated Claimant would have difficulty doing), 
and got a job at a call center. Mr. Crum's assertion that Claimant's hand injury will 
"severely impact his vocational options for the rest of his life" appears to be vastly overstated, 
thanks to Claimant's drive, desire, adaptability, and perseverance. 
49. While Mr. Crum lists many of Claimant's assets in his report, he fails to highlight 
those assets when preparing his analysis. Claimant is fluent in Spanish and English, both spoken 
and written, is good at math, and has significant skills with basic computer programs used 
in business, including spreadsheets, Photoshop, and Word. He took advanced computer classes 
in high school including business applications and principles of marketing. He has a strong 
interest in business, and enjoyed his business classes. He has no prior impediments 
to employment, nor a criminal record. Claimant continues to pursue the hobbies he enjoys, 
and is willing to try new business opportunities, even if he is not sure he will be able to succeed. 
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50. Claimant has no desire to do heavy manual labor, and apparently never did. 
He consistently projected his future as one which included higher education and a job 
in business, not heavy labor and/or construction. Through his education, he has been able to 
escape many of the same jobs his injury precluded him from doing. 
51. Certainly Claimant lost the ability to do any job which exceeds his lifting, pulling, 
and carrymg limitations imposed in 2009, including those jobs in a heavy category or 
which require frequent fine grasping with the right hand. No one is arguing that Claimant has 
no permanent disability. The issue is whether his disability exceeds his 32% whole person 
impairment rating. 
52. Within the job categories Claimant has expressed an interest in, few lost 
opportunities come to mind. Claimant has shown a strong desire to adapt, and succeed. 
As noted at hearing, he would have difficulty putting tiny screws into tiny holes with his 
right hand. Other similar jobs requiring fine manipulation with his right hand would be 
precluded, as would jobs which require over 20 pounds lifting, 5 pound gripping and carrying 
with his right hand, pushing and pulling more than 75 and 50 pounds, respectively. 
See CE 2, p. 10. Those restrictions leave a plethora of jobs available to Claimant, given his 
motivation to work. 
53. Applying the listed factors in Idaho Code § 72-430, Claimant clearly incurred 
a graphic permanent physically-noticeable injury which will impact his ability to obtain or hold 
certain employment opportunities. On the other hand, he has no pre-existing limiting conditions 
which hinder his ability to work. He has chosen career opportunities which minimize the effect 
of his disability, by consistently opting for office work. Claimant is young, confident, 
and willing to learn. He has technology skills -prevalent within his age group. His attitude 
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and drive will serve him well in the open labor market. Contrary to Mr. Crum's testimony that 
employers do not want to hire "problems" such as Claimant's deformed hand, it appears 
many are willing to give Claimant just such an opportunity. 
54. When considering the totality of the evidence, and ignoring for now 
Claimant's PPI rating and benefits paid, which will be discussed below, it does not appear 
Claimant has suffered a loss of more than 30% of his applicable labor market, and no loss of 
earning capacity. Since earning capacity is of minor relevance when compared to loss of job 
market, the Referee finds Claimant's non-medical PPD is 25%. 
55. Claimant argues he is entitled to PPD benefits even if they do not exceed 
his impairment rating and corresponding benefits paid thereunder, citing as authority 
Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791, 391 P.3d (2017). While Davis dealt with 
the Commission's jurisdiction to enforce a compensation agreement, ruling that the Commission 
lacked jurisdiction to approve the proposed stipulation, the latest word specifically on the issue 
at hand is Dickinson v. Adams County, 2017 IIC 0007 (March 21, 2017). Dickinson is 
controlling law on this issue. 
56. As explained by Dickinson "permanent impairment," is actually only payable 
as a component of disability-less-than-total under Idaho Code § 72-428. Impairment is not 
a separately owed and payable benefit apart from PPD. Disability paid under the heading of 
"permanent partial impairment" or PPI is included, and credited against any payment made 
under PPD. Sometimes PPD will be larger than PPI, since PPD includes those non-medical 
factors that impact Claimant's ability to be gainfully employed, and sometimes it will not. 
Here PPD is not greater than the PPI rating previously given. Since Claimant has been paid 
"impairment," benefits, which are actually disability benefits, of 32% whole person, a finding of 
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25% whole person PPD is subsumed within the 32% whole person benefit previously paid. 
Claimant is entitled to the larger of the disability components, which in this case is the PPI 
payments previously paid. 
57. Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to payment of additional benefits 
for PPD not in excess of the 32% PPI benefits previously paid under Idaho Code§ 72-428. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
58. Attorney fees are not granted to a claimant as a matter of right under the Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Law. They may be recovered only under the circumstances set forth 
in Idaho Code § 72-804, which provides for an award of attorney fees to a claimant 
if the employer or surety contest a claim without reasonable ground, refuses to pay compensation 
provided by law, or discontinues payment of benefits without reasonable grounds. 
Th~ decision that grounds exist for awarding a claimant attorney fees is a factual determination 
that rests with the Commission. Troutner v. Traffic Control Company, 97 Idaho 525, 528, 
547 P.2d 1130, 1133 (1976). 
59. As Claimant failed to carry his burden of proving his entitlement to the benefits 
which were the subject of this proceeding, there is no basis for the award of attorney fees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to reimbursement and corresponding 
temporary total disability benefits under Idaho Code§ 72-450; 
2. Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to additional permanent partial 
disability benefits in excess of the 32% whole person impairment benefits previously paid; 
3. Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to an award of attorney fees 
under Idaho Code § 72-804. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Referee 
recommends that the Commission adopt such findings and conclusions as its own and issue 
an appropriate final order. 
DATED this ;l.7--h day of_-----=J_v..c..-l'I.__ _ , 2017. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Brian Harper, Referee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~5ltuay of ~ , 2017, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, C CLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
RECOMMENDATION was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
W BRECK SEINIGER 
942 MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
jsk 
R DANIEL BOWEN 
PO BOX 1007 
BOISE ID 83701-1007 
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RULE STEEL TANKS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
ADV ANT AGE WORKERS 






AUG 2 5 2017 
IHOOSTRW.~ 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-71 7, Referee Brian Harper submitted the record in the 
above-entitled matter, together with his recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, to 
the members of the Idaho Industrial Commission for their review. Each of the undersigned 
Commissioners has reviewed the record and the recommendations of the Referee. The 
Commission concurs with these recommendations. Therefore, the Commission approves, 
confirms, and adopts the Referee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions oflaw as its own. 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to reimbursement and corresponding 
temporary total disability benefits under Idaho Code § 72-450. 
2. Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to additional permanent partial 
disability benefits in excess of the 32% whole person impairment benefits previously paid. 
ORDER-1 
3. Claimant has failed to prove he 1s entitled to an award of attorney fees 
under Idaho Code § 72-804. 
4. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to 
all matters adjudicated. 
DATED thisae1'aay of~' 2017. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
Assis~atl.t Commissiin ~cretary 
~ ... ~ .•.. .. * .. :: 
,., /t~ ......... •~ ... .. 
",,,,:Up}j)\\\'"'i .,,"'"' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of a,.~ , 2017, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was served by regular U ~d States Mail upon each of the following: 
W BRECK SEINIGER 
942 MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
jsk 
ORDER-2 
R DANIEL BOWEN 
PO BOX 1007 
BOISE ID 83701 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 




Rule Steel Tanks, Inc., Employer, and Pinnacle 
Risk Management, Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 08-024772 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Comes now the claimant, by and through his attorney of record, and moves this 
Honorable Commission to reconsider its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation entered in this matter on August 25, 2017. The grounds upon which this 
motion is based are set forth in the memorandum filed here with. 
September 13, 2017. 
/) ,/ 
i1'1t_'X>t 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
Attorney for Claimant 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
-1-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On September 13, 2017 I served the foregoing by facsimile transmission on: 
Dan Bowen 
1311 W. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 1007 
Boise, ID 83701-1007 
Fax: (208) 344-9670 
., ,,.--
1/6/~-p;."tJt 
,,., L--· ,,___,,- tJ 
wm Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
Attorneys for Claimant 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
-2- ~,, 
R. DANIEL BOWEN (ISB #2673) 
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP 
1311 W. JEFFERSON ST. 
P.O. BOX 1007 
BOISE, ID 83701-1007 
Telephone: (208) 344-7200 
Facsimile: (208) 344-9670 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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) _______________ ) 
J.C. No.: 2008-024772 
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
AND OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
COME NOW Defendants, by and through counsel of record, responding to Claimant's 
Motion for Reconsideration, objecting to the same, as is discussed further in Defendants' own 
memorandum. Further, Defendants object to Claimant's Motion for Extension of Time to File 
Supplemental Memorandum based upon Idaho Code § 72-718 and Industrial Commission Rules 
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND OBJECTION TO 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 
aao 
of Judicial Procedure, Rule G, which state that motions to reconsider shall be made within 20 
days of the date of the final decision and shall be supported by a brief filed with the motion, 
( emphasis added). The rule does not allow for extensions of time for additional briefing. 
5f 
DATED this _di_:_ day of September, 2017. 
BOWEN & BAILEY, L.L.P. 
R. DANIEL BOWEN - of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
5T 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the L day of September, 2017, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document was served upon the following party(ies) in the method indicated: 
W BRECK SEINIGER ESQ 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES 
942 W MYRTLE ST 
BOISE ID 83702 
FAX: (208) 345-4700 
0 U.S.MAIL 
0 HAND DELIVERY 
ur'FACSIMILE 
R. Daniel Bowen 
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND OBJECTION TO 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
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RULE STEEL TANKS, INC., 
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and 
ADV ANT AGE WORKERS 




ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Fl LED 
JAN O 5 2018 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
On or about September 14, 2017, Claimant filed his timely Motion for Reconsideration of 
the Commission's August 25, 2017 Order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
authored by Referee Harper. Claimant filed a contemporaneous brief in support of his motion as 
required by JRP Rule 3(G). In his supporting brief, Claimant argues that the Commission erred 
in declining to award Claimant disability in excess of his 32% PPI rating. First, the Commission 
erroneously concluded that because Claimant had designs upon pursuing higher education even 
before the work accident, there was insufficient proof that the education he pursued following 
the work accident was necessitated by that accident. Further, since the vocational evidence 
established that Claimant's post-accident education was responsible for significantly reducing his 
disability, it was error for the Commission to decline to award Claimant reimbursement for the 
expenses associated with those educational endeavors. Finally, the Commission's finding that 
Claimant's post-injury education diminished his disability was inconsistent with the 
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Commission's observation that since Claimant was able to work in the fast food industry both 
before and after the subject accident this augured against a finding that he suffered accident-
produced disability. 
The other major basis for Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration is his assertion that the 
Commission erred in not granting Claimant disability in the amount of 25% of the whole person, 
over and above the 32% PPI rating previously paid. Per Corgatelli v. Steel West, /nc., 157 Idaho 
287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) disability and impairment are separate classes of benefits, and are 
therefore separately payable. In treating impairment as a component of disability, the 
Commission denied Claimant the separate awards of impairment and disability envisioned by 
Corgatelli and the subsequent case of Davis v. Hammack Management, Inc., 161 Idaho 791, 391 
P.3d 1261 (2017). 
Defendants responded on September 21, 2017. Defendants argue that while the 
Commission's decision that Claimant is not entitled to payments above and beyond the 32% 
impairment rating previously paid as disability is potentially at odds with both Corgatelli and 
Davis, it is entirely consistent with Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 370 P.3d 738 
(2016), and the recent Commission decision Dickinson v. Adams County, 2017 IIC 0007 (2017), 
discussing the conflicting holdings of Corgatelli and Mayer. As to Claimant's other arguments, 
Defendants assert that the Commission did not err in recognizing that Claimant's post-accident 
educational activities improved his access to the labor market; the Commission's decision does 
not penalize Claimant for advancing his own interests. 
Claimant filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718. 
Pursuant to that section, the Commission may rehear or reconsider its decision based on the 
arguments of the parties. A motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a 
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recitation of the factual findings and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party takes 
issue. However, the Commission is not ordinarily inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments 
simply because a case was not resolved in the moving party's favor. 
In this matter, it was the principal thrust of Claimant's claim that he suffered significant 
disability as a consequence of the permanent limitations/ restrictions stemming from the July 30, 
2008 accident involving his right hand. Claimant acknowledged that his post-accident 
educational and employment-related activities significantly improved his access to the labor 
market following the accident. He argued that Employer should be required to reimburse 
Claimant for the expenses associated with his education pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-450, or, 
failing that, his disability should be evaluated without taking into consideration the education he 
pursued, at his own expense, following the subject accident. In other words, Employer should 
not be allowed to avoid reimbursing Claimant for the expenses associated with his education 
while, at the same time, enjoying the benefits of Claimant's admirable impetus to pull himself up 
by his own boot straps, thus improving his employment opportunities. 
The Commission first determined that Claimant did not qualify for retraining benefits 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-450. In order to qualify for benefits under that section, it must be 
demonstrated that the injured worker is "in need of retraining in another field, skill or vocation in 
order to restore his earning capacity ... " As developed in the original decision, this language 
implies that at the time of injury a claimant had an established field, skill or vocation from which 
he was precluded as a consequence of the accident. Claimant did not require retraining in order 
to "restore" his time-of-injury earning capacity because the accident did not leave him unable to 
exploit any previously held skill or vocation. Claimant could not be said to be in need of 
retraining in some other field when the evidence failed to demonstrate an initial or established 
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field in which he was no longer able to compete because of his injuries. In other words, the 
statute, on its face, does not anticipate the type of educational training that is at issue here. 
Claimant did not pursue a course of retraining, but he assuredly pursued a course of training by 
acting upon his desire to pursue education secondary to his high school graduation. We decline 
to characterize Claimant's designs upon obtaining an education as the retraining anticipated by 
Idaho Code § 72-450. 
Claimant's fall back position is that if Defendants cannot be required to pay retraining 
benefits pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-450, they should not reap the fruits of Claimant's pursuit of 
further education. Essentially, Claimant would have us evaluate his disability as though he had 
done nothing to help himself following the accident. 
Such cases come before us infrequently, but they do arise. Such individuals, because of 
bad advice, or by dint of their own reasoning, conclude that the greater their disablement, the 
greater will be their award of disability under the workers' compensation system. Although 
workers' compensation, as envisioned, is intended to assist injured workers in their recovery and 
return to work, there is no denying that for a small handful of workers, the Act creates a perverse 
incentive for a poor outcome following a work injury; the Act pays benefits for those who are yet 
disabled, notwithstanding their having reached maximum medical improvement. When these 
cases arise, they are always somewhat disheartening, as they represent a failure of some sort 
along the way. 
On the other hand, this case represents the most hopeful outcome of a work injury. What 
Claimant did is what everyone should do. Paradoxically, this means he is not as disabled as he 
would otherwise have been, and will not recover an award to compensate him for disability over 
and above disability caused by impairment, since he has none. This is what is supposed to 
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happen, and we commend Claimant for his drive, and for getting on with his life. We appreciate 
that Claimant may feel he is being penalized for doing the right thing. However, in the long run, 
the course he chose will serve him much better than the modest disability award he might have 
realized, had he sat on his hands and done nothing to improve his situation after reaching MMI. 
Claimant's laudable perseverance does not mean, however, that Defendants must assume 
financial responsibility for all that Claimant has done on his own behalf in order to take 
advantage of the facts that exist as of the date of hearing. We find no basis to measure 
Claimant's disability on some date other than the date of hearing. Nor do we accept Claimant's 
argument that because evaluation as of that date happens to inure to the advantage of Defendants, 
they must either pay for Claimant's education or forego reliance on the facts of this case as they 
have developed though the date of hearing. Nothing in the statutory scheme or case law forces 
this choice on Defendants. We are satisfied that the evidence demonstrates that the subject 
accident did not materially change Claimant's designs upon pursuing education after high 
school. This he did, and those facts must be taken into account when evaluating Claimant's 
disability. 
Claimant also argues that the Commission erred in acknowledging that Claimant suffered 
disability of 25% of the whole person as a consequence of the subject accident, yet concluding 
that no further award of disability was payable, since Claimant has already received payment of a 
32% disability rating based on impairment. Per Claimant, the Commission's decision is at odds 
with the explicit direction of the Court in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 333 P.3d 
115 (2014) and, more recently, Davis v. Hammock Management, 161 Idaho 791,391 P.3d 1261 
(2017). In response, Defendants point out that the Commission has addressed this precise issue 
in the recent case of Dickinson v. Adams County, 2017 IIC 0007 (2017). In Dickinson, the 
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Commission noted that Corgatelli recognizes that PPI and PPD are entirely different classes of 
workers' compensation benefits, and that nothing in the statutory scheme recognizes that an 
employer is allowed to credit the payment of a PPI rating against a subsequent obligation to pay 
disability. Claimant argues that the rule of Corgatelli requires surety to pay both the 32% PPI 
rating and the 25% disability award. We recognize that Corgatelli supports this proposition. 
However, as we explained in Dickinson, Corgatelli cannot be reconciled with certain language 
appearing in the subsequent case of Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 370 P.3d 738 
(2016). Mayer contains the following footnote by Justice Burdick, the author of the majority 
opm10n. 
TPC attempts to make much of the fact that Idaho Code section 72-428 uses the 
term "permanent disability" to describe awards specified under section 72-428's 
"scheduled permanent impairments." This interchange of terms, TPC argues, 
makes the use of the term "permanent disability" ambiguous in section 72-431. 
However, the forerunner of Idaho Code section 72-428 was enacted in 1917, and 
since that time the Idaho Code has always referred to a disability award, not an 
impairment award. Although the term "impairment award" has crept into the 
vernacular of the workmen's compensation bar, Idaho's Workmen's Compensation 
Law only provides for an award of income benefits based on disability, not 
impairment. Fowler v. City of Rexburg, 116 Idaho 1, 3 n. 5, 773 P.2d 269, 271 n. 
5 (1988) ( "Income benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation Law, 
with the exception of retraining benefits, LC. § 72-450, are based upon disability, 
either temporary or permanent, but not merely impairment."). A "permanent 
impairment" as the definitions themselves make clear, is simply a component of a 
"permanent disability." LC. §§ 72-422, -423. Thus, any final award made under 
Idaho's Workmen's Compensation Law is properly referred to as a disability 
award. Fowler, 116 Idaho at 3 n. 5, 773 P.2d at 271 n. 5 ("While in some cases 
the non-medical factors will not increase the permanent disability rating over the 
amount of the permanent impairment rating, the ultimate award of income 
benefits is based upon the permanent disability rating, not merely the impairment 
rating."); see also Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, 106 Idaho 716, 722, 682 P.2d 
1263, 1269 (1984). 
Id. at FN 1. (Emphasis supplied). 
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As we explained in Dickinson, once it is recognized that impairment is a component part of 
disability, then the objections raised by the Corgatelli Court to the payment of PPI as a credit 
against a subsequent award of disability tend to evaporate. Further, as developed in Dickinson, 
while certain portions of the statutory scheme do appear to create a distinction between 
impairment and disability, impairment is only payable as disability pursuant to the provisions of 
Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429. There is no separate statutory mechanism 
authorizing the payment of impairment as something other than disability. We find no reason to 
depart from the analysis developed in Dickinson, and conclude the Mayer represents the current 
state of the law on this issue. Of course, Davis was decided subsequent to Mayer, and as 
Claimant has noted, Davis cites Corgatelli with approval on the question of whether or not PPI 
can be applied as a credit against an award of disability. 
A review of Davis reveals that it is less about parsmg Corgatelli, and more about 
considering the application of Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist., 147 Idaho 277, 207 
P.3d 1008 (2009). Davis involved the Commission's approval of a lump sum settlement which 
recognized employer's right to a credit in the amount of a previously paid PPI award, to be 
applied against its obligation to pay permanent partial disability calculated under Idaho Code § 
72-428. Two months after the Commission's approval of the Davis lump sum, the Court issued 
Corgatelli. The Davis Court noted that Corgatelli establishes that Idaho law does not endorse 
the application of the payment of PPI as a credit against a subsequent disability award. 
However, the issue before the Court in Davis was whether the Commission had jurisdiction to 
approve a settlement which violated the Act. The answer, made clear by Wernecke, is no. While 
Corgatelli was the basis for the finding that the Commission acted outside the bounds of its 
jurisdiction, Corgatelli was not, itself, the subject of further discussion by the Court; the 
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rationale of that decision received no further treatment or illumination, and Davis, except in 
recognizing the rule of Corgatelli, leaves us no closer to understanding how Corgatelli might be 
reconciled with what seems to be an entirely different point of view expressed in Mayer. For 
these reasons, we do not find Davis instructive on the questions which are the subject of our 
analysis in Dickinson. 
It is more frequently the case that impairment, though a component of a disability award, 
does not represent the full extent of Claimant's disability, once account is taken of the various 
non-medical factors referenced at Idaho Code § 72-430. Here, however, Claimant's impairment 
paid as disability is found to more than adequately compensate him for whatever disability he 
has suffered as a consequence of the subject accident. It would, indeed, award Claimant a 
windfall to require the payment of an additional 25%, over and above the 32% disability award 
that has already been paid, since that 32% rating represents impairment paid as disability, and 
Claimant has failed to demonstrate that he has suffered disability in excess of his impairment. 
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
DATED this 5-fn day of 
ss1s , 0~1ssion Sec ary 
✓ • ~ - ✓ • ) ~ ,v,.-.,s -...:•..., .. 
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I hereby certify that on the '5~ day of, ~, 2018, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTJONF(Ot RECONSIDERATION was 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
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Rule Steel Tanks, Inc., Employer, and Pinnacle 
Risk Management, Surety, 
Defendants, Respondents 
LC. No. 08-024772 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS RULE STEEL TANKS, INC., Employer, 
and PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT, Surety and DAN BOWEN, their attorney, (whose 
address is Dan Bowen, Bowen & Bailey, 1311 W. Jefferson, P.O. Box 1007, Boise, ID 83701-
1007, Fax: (208) 344-9670, Email: info@bowen-bailey.com) and THE CLERK OF THE 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. ORDERS APPEALED 
The above-named appellant, Bryan Oliveros, appeals against the above-named 
respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from all orders entered in this case, including but 
not limited to the following: 
1.1 Order entered on August 25, 2017 by Thomas E Limbaugh, Chairman; 
1.2 Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on January 5, 2018 by 
Thomas E Limbaugh, Chairman. 
2. COPIES OF THE ORDERS BEING APPEALED 
Please see the attached. 
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3. RIGHT TO APPEAL 
The orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
Rule 11 ( d)( 1) I.A.R. 
4. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
a. Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err in adopting the findings of fact 
and conclusions oflaw ofreferee Brian Harper? (Order entered on August 25, 
2017) 
4.2 ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 2017-2018 
ORDERS REGARDING CLAIMANT'S ENTITLEMENT TO RETRAINING BENEFITS 
a. Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err in failing to give Idaho Code § 
72-450 the liberal construction to which the Claimant is entitled? (Order entered 
on August 25, 2017; Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on 
January 5, 2018) 
b. Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err in concluding that the claimant 
failed to prove that he was entitled to reimbursement and corresponding total 
temporary disabilities under Idaho code section 72 - 450? (Order entered on 
August 25, 2017; Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on 
January 5, 2018) 
4.3 ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 2017-2018 
ORDERS REGARDING CLAIMANT'S ENTITLEMENT TO PERMANENT DISABILITY 
BENEFITS 
a. Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err in concluding that the claimant 
failed to prove that he was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits in 
excess of the 32% whole person impairment benefits previously paid? (Order 
entered on August 25, 2017; Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration 
entered on January 5, 2018) 
4.4 ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS DISREGARD OF CONTROLLING IDAHO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
REGARDING UNIMPEACHED AND UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY 
a. Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in concluding 
that it had discretion to disregard the unrebutted opinions of Claimant's 
vocational expert, Douglas Crum, in contravention of the holding of Pierstorff v. 
Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438,447,448, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937) (Pierstorff, 
first tried to the Industrial Commission, remains applicable to adjudications by the 
Idaho Industrial Commission, Swanson v. State, 114 Idaho 607, 609, 759 P.2d 
898, 900, (1988)) and its progeny? (Order entered on August 25, 2017; Order on 
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on January 5, 2018) 
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b. Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in arbitrarily or 
capriciously disregard the unrebutted opinions of Claimant's vocational expert, 
Douglas Crum, which was unimpeached by any of the modes known to the law, 
and did not exceed probability in contravention of the holdings in Pierstorff v. 
Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438,447,448, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937) Jeffrey v. 
Trouse, 100 Mont. 538, 50 P.2d 872, 874 [(1935)] and Gerdon v. Con Paulos, 
Inc., 160 Idaho 335,343, 372 P.3d 390,398, 2016. (Order on Claimant's Motion 
for Reconsideration entered on January 5, 2018; Order on Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration entered on January 5, 2018) 
c. Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in failing to 
follow the law as laid down in Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 447, 
448, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937) and its progeny? (Order entered on August 25, 
2017; Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on January 5, 
2018) 
4.5 ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS DISREGARD OF CONTROLLING IDAHO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
REGARDING THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF IDAHO CODE§ 72-
425 CONTROLLING IDAHO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT CONCERNING PERMANENT 
IMPAIRMENT AND PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS 
a. Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in its 
interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-425 and disregarding the precedent of the Idaho 
Supreme Court laid down in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,335 
P.3d 1150 (2014) and reiterated the holding in Corgatelli in Davis v. Hammack 
Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791,795,391 P.3d 1261, 1265, (2017) concerning deduction of 
permanent impairment benefits from permanent disability benefits? (Order 
entered on August 25, 2017; Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration 
entered on January 5, 2018) 
b. Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err in denying Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Order entered on August 25, 2017? (Order on Claimant's 
Motion for Reconsideration entered on January 5, 2018) 
4.6 ISSUES RELATED TO CLAIMANT/APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
a. Did the violate Claimant's Constitutional rights and the Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers by ignoring, and thereby effectively overruling, the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decisions in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,335 
P.3d 1150 (2014) and Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791,795,391 P.3d 
1261, 1265, (2017). (Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on 
January 5, 2018) 
b. Did the violate Claimant's Constitutional right to equal protection by 
ignoring, and thereby effectively overruling, the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions 
in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,335 P.3d 1150 (2014) and Davis 
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v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791,795,391 P.3d 1261, 1265, (2017). (Order on 
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on January 5, 2018) 
5. · SEALING OF THE RECORD 
Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
If so, what portion? 
5.1 Is a reporter's transcript requested? No, transcripts of the hearings previously 
prepared will be included in the Agency's Record as exhibits. 
6. AGENCY RECORD REQUESTED 
The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Agency's Record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
a. All exhibits offered during the hearing of December 7, 2011; 
b. The transcript of the hearing of February 22, 2017; 
c. All exhibits offered during the hearing of February 22, 2017; 
d. Memorandum In Support Of Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration 
filed September 14, 2017; 
e. Reply Memorandum In Support Of Claimant's Motion For 
Reconsideration filed October 18, 2017; 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: Not 
applicable. 
(b) (1) □ That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(2) D That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because 
(c) (1) IZI That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has 
been paid. 
(2) D That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because ________________ _ 
( d) (1) IZI That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
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(2) D That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. 
DATED February 15, 2018. 
/s/ Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
SEINIGER LAW 
Attorneys for the Claimant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On February 15, 2018, I served the foregoing by facsimile transmission on: 
Dan Bowen 
1311 W. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 1007 
Boise, ID 83701-1007 
Fax: (208) 344-9670 
... , _,..-
/!JI j.--.. ~  ;,jh 
L-- r-, ~ t 
Isl Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
SEINIGER LAW 
Attorneys for the Claimant/Appellant 
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AUG 2 5 2017 
IHOOSlRIAl~ 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-717, Referee Brian Harper submitted the record in the 
above-entitled matter, together with his recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, to 
the members of the Idaho Industrial Commission for their review. Each of the undersigned 
Commissioners has reviewed the record and the recommendations of the Referee. The 
Commission concurs with these recommendations. Therefore, the Commission approves, 
confirms, and adopts the Referee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own. 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to reimbursement and corresponding 
temporary total disability benefits under Idaho Code§ 72-450. 
2. Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to additional permanent partial 
disability benefits in excess of the 32% whole person impairment benefits previously paid. 
ORDER-1 
3. Claimant has failed to prove he 1s entitled to an award of attorney fees 
under Idaho Code§ 72-804. 
4. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to 




Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the tJY"day of ~,u..il5t , 2017, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was served by regularU ~d States Mail upon each of the following: 
W BRECK SEINIGER 
942 MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
jsk 
ORDER-2 
R DANIEL BOWEN 
PO BOX 1007 
BOISE ID 83701 












ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
FILED 
JAN U 5 2018 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
On or about September 14, 2017, Claimant filed his timely Motion for Reconsideration of 
the Commission's August 25, 2017 Order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
authored by Referee Harper. Claimant filed a contemporaneous brief in support of his motion as 
required by JRP Rule 3(G). In his supporting brief, Claimant argues that the Commission erred 
in declining to award Claimant disability in excess of his 32% PPI rating. First, the Commission 
erroneously concluded that because Claimant had designs upon pursuing higher education even 
before the work accident, there was insufficient proof that the education he pursued following 
the work accident was necessitated by that accident. Further, since the vocational evidence 
established that Claimant's post-accident education was responsible for significantly reducing his 
disability, it was error for the Commission to decline to award Claimant reimbursement for the 
expenses associated with those educational endeavors. Finally, the Commission's finding that 
Claimant's post-injury education diminished his disability was inconsistent with the 
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Commission's observation that since Claimant was able to work in the fast food industry both 
before and after the subject accident this augured against a finding that he suffered accident-
produced disability. 
The other major basis for Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration is his assertion that the 
Commission erred in not granting Claimant disability in the amount of 25% of the whole person, 
over and above the 32% PPI rating previously paid. Per Corgatelli v. Steel West, fnc., 157 Idaho 
287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) disability and impairment are separate classes of benefits, and are 
therefore separately payable. In treating impairment as a component of disability, the 
Commission denied Claimant the separate awards of impairment and disability envisioned by 
Corgatelli and the subsequent case of Davis v. Hammack Management, Inc., 161 Idaho 791, 391 
P.3d 1261 (2017). 
Defendants responded on September 21, 2017. Defendants argue that while the 
Commission's decision that Claimant is not entitled to payments above and beyond the 32% 
impairment rating previously paid as disability is potentially at odds with both Corgatelli and 
Davis, it is entirely consistent with Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 370 P.3d 738 
(2016), and the recent Commission decision Dickinson v. Adams County, 2017 ITC 0007 (2017), 
discussing the conflicting holdings of Corgatelli and Mayer. As to Claimant's other arguments, 
Defendants assert that the Commission did not err in recognizing that Claimant's post-accident 
educational activities improved his access to the labor market; the Commission's decision does 
not penalize Claimant for advancing his own interests. 
Claimant filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718. 
Pursuant to that section, the Commission may rehear or reconsider its decision based on the 
arguments of the paiiies. A motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a 
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recitation of the factual findings and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party takes 
issue. However, the Commission is not ordinarily inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments 
simply because a case was not resolved in the moving party's favor. 
In this matter, it was the principal thrust of Claimant's claim that he suffered significant 
disability as a consequence of the permanent limitations / restrictions stemming from the July 30, 
2008 accident involving his right hand. Claimant acknowledged that his post-accident 
educational and employment-related activities significantly improved his access to the labor 
market following the accident. He argued that Employer should be required to reimburse 
Claimant for the expenses associated with his education pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-450, or, 
failing that, his disability should be evaluated without taking into consideration the education he 
pursued, at his own expense, following the subject accident. In other words, Employer should 
not be allowed to avoid reimbursing Claimant for the expenses associated with his education 
while, at the same time, enjoying the benefits of Claimant's admirable impetus to pull himself up 
by his own boot straps, thus improving his employment opportunities. 
The Commission first determined that Claimant did not qualify for retraining benefits 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-450. In order to qualify for benefits under that section, it must be 
demonstrated that the injured worker is "in need of retraining in another field, skill or vocation in 
order to restore his earning capacity ... " As developed in the original decision, this language 
implies that at the time of injury a claimant had an established field, skill or vocation from which 
he was precluded as a consequence of the accident. Claimant did not require retraining in order 
to "restore" his time-of-injury earning capacity because the accident did not leave him unable to 
exploit any previously held skill or vocation. Claimant could not be said to be in need of 
retraining in some other field when the evidence failed to demonstrate an initial or established 
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field in which he was no longer able to compete because of his injuries. In other words, the 
statute, on its face, does not anticipate the type of educational training that is at issue here. 
Claimant did not pursue a course of retraining, but he assuredly pursued a course of training by 
acting upon his desire to pursue education secondary to his high school graduation. We decline 
to characterize Claimant's designs upon obtaining an education as the retraining anticipated by 
Idaho Code § 72-450. 
Claimant's fallback position is that if Defendants cannot be required to pay retraining 
benefits pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-450, they should not reap the fruits of Claimant's pursuit of 
further education. Essentially, Claimant would have us evaluate his disability as though he had 
done nothing to help himself following the accident. 
Such cases come before us infrequently, but they do arise. Such individuals, because of 
bad advice, or by dint of their own reasoning, conclude that the greater their disablement, the 
greater will be their award of disability under the workers' compensation system. Although 
workers' compensation, as envisioned, is intended to assist injured workers in their recovery and 
return to work, there is no denying that for a small handful of workers, the Act creates a perverse 
incentive for a poor outcome following a work injury; the Act pays benefits for those who are yet 
disabled, notwithstanding their having reached maximum medical improvement. When these 
cases arise, they are always somewhat disheartening, as they represent a failure of some sort 
along the way. 
On the other hand, this case represents the most hopeful outcome of a work injury. What 
Claimant did is what everyone should do. Paradoxically, this means he is not as disabled as he 
would otherwise have been, and will not recover an award to compensate him for disability over 
and above disability caused by impairment, since he has none. This is what is supposed to 
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happen, and we commend Claimant for his drive, and for getting on with his life. We appreciate 
that Claimant may feel he is being penalized for doing the right thing. However, in the long run, 
the course he chose will serve him much better than the modest disability award he might have 
realized, had he sat on his hands and done nothing to improve his situation after reaching MMI. 
Claimant's laudable perseverance does not mean, however, that Defendants must assume 
financial responsibility for all that Claimant has done on his own behalf in order to take 
advantage of the facts that exist as of the date of hearing. We find no basis to measure 
Claimant's disability on some date other than the date of hearing. Nor do we accept Claimant's 
argument that because evaluation as of that date happens to inure to the advantage of Defendants, 
they must either pay for Claimant's education or forego reliance on the facts of this case as they 
have developed though the date of hearing. Nothing in the statutory scheme or case law forces 
this choice on Defendants. We are satisfied that the evidence demonstrates that the subject 
accident did not materially change Claimant's designs upon pursuing education after high 
school. This he did, and those facts must be taken into account when evaluating Claimant's 
disability. 
Claimant also argues that the Commission erred in acknowledging that Claimant suffered 
disability of 25% of the whole person as a consequence of the subject accident, yet concluding 
that no further award of disability was payable, since Claimant has already received payment of a 
32% disability rating based on impairment. Per Claimant, the Commission's decision is at odds 
with the explicit direction of the Court in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 333 P.3d 
l 15 (2014) and, more recently, Davis v. Hammock Management, 161 Idaho 791,391 P.3d 1261 
(2017). In response, Defendants point out that the Commission has addressed this precise issue 
in the recent case of Dickinson v. Adams County, 2017 IIC 0007 (2017). In Dickinson, the 
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Commission noted that Corgatelli recognizes that PPI and PPD are entirely different classes of 
workers' compensation benefits, and that nothing in the statutory scheme recognizes that an 
employer is allowed to credit the payment of a PPI rating against a subsequent obligation to pay 
disability. Claimant argues that the rule of Corgatelli requires surety to pay both the 32% PPI 
rating and the 25% disability award. We recognize that Corgatelli supports this proposition. 
However, as we explained in Dickinson, Corgatelli cannot be reconciled with certain language 
appearing in the subsequent case of Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 370 P.3d 738 
(2016). Mayer contains the following footnote by Justice Burdick, the author of the majority 
opm10n. 
TPC attempts to make much of the fact that Idaho Code section 72-428 uses the 
term "permanent disability" to describe awards specified under section 72-428's 
"scheduled permanent impairments." This interchange of terms, TPC argues, 
makes the use of the term "pemrnnent disability" ambiguous in section 72-431. 
However, the forerunner of Idaho Code section 72-428 was enacted in 1917, and 
since that time the Idaho Code has always referred to a disability award, not an 
impairment award. Although the term "impairment award" has crept into the 
vernacular of the workmen's compensation bar, Idaho's Workmen's Compensation 
Law only provides for an award of income benefits based on disability, not 
impairment. Fowler v. City of Rexburg, 116 Idaho 1, 3 n. 5, 773 P.2d 269, 271 n. 
5 (1988) ( "Income benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation Law, 
with the exception of retraining benefits, I.C. § 72-450, are based upon disability, 
either temporary or permanent, but not merely impairment."). ~ermanent 
impairment" as the definitions themselves make clear, is simply a component of a 
"permanent disability." I.C. §§ 72-422, -423. Thus. any final award made under 
Idaho's Workmen's Compensation Law is properly refen-ed to as a disability 
award. Fowler, 116 Idaho at 3 n. 5, 773 P.2d at 271 n. 5 ("While in some cases 
the non-medical factors will not increase the permanent disability rating over the 
amount of the permanent impairment rating, the ultimate award of income 
benefits is based upon the permanent disability rating, not merely the impairment 
rating."); see also Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, 106 Idaho 716, 722, 682 P.2d 
1263, 1269 (1984). 
Id at FN 1. (Emphasis supplied). 
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As we explained in Dickinson, once it is recognized that impairment is a component part of 
disability, then the o~jections raised by the Corgatelli Court to the payment of PPI as a credit 
against a subsequent award of disability tend to evaporate. Further, as developed in Dickinson, 
while certain portions of the statutory scheme do appear to create a distinction between 
impainnent and disability, impairment is only payable as disability pursuant to the provisions of 
Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429. There is no separate statutory mechanism 
authorizing the payment of impairment as something other than disability. We find no reason to 
depart from the analysis developed in Dickinson, and conclude the Mayer represents the current 
state of the law on this issue. Of course, Davis was decided subsequent to Mayer, and as 
Claimant has noted, Davis cites Corgatelli with approval on the question of whether or not PPI 
can be applied as a credit against an award of disability. 
A review of Davis reveals that it is less about parsmg Corgatelli, and more about 
considering the application of Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist., 147 Idaho 277, 207 
P.3d 1008 (2009). Davis involved the Commission's approval of a Jump sum settlement which 
recognized employer's right to a credit in the amount of a previously paid PPI award, to be 
applied against its obligation to pay permanent partial disability calculated under Idaho Code § 
72-428. Two months after the Commission's approval of the Davis lump sum, the Comi issued 
Corgatelli. The Davis Court noted that Corgatelli establishes that Idaho law does not endorse 
the application of the payment of PPI as a credit against a subsequent disability award. 
However, the issue before the Court in Davis was whether the Commission had jurisdiction to 
approve a settlement which violated the Act. The answer, made clear by Wernecke, is no. While 
Corgatelli was the basis for the finding that the Commission acted outside the bounds of its 
jurisdiction, Corgatelli was not, itself, the subject of further discussion by the Comi; the· 
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rationale of that decision received no further treatment or illumination, and Davis, except in 
recognizing the rule of Corgatelli, leaves us no closer to understanding how Corgatelli might be 
reconciled with what seems to be an entirely different point of view expressed in Mayer. For 
these reasons, we do not find Davis instructive on the questions which are the subject of our 
analysis in Dickinson. 
It is more frequently the case that impairment, though a component of a disability award, 
does not represent the full extent of Claimant's disability, once account is taken of the various 
non-medical factors referenced at Idaho Code § 72-430. Here, however, Claimant's impairment 
paid as disability is found to more than adequately compensate him for whatever disability he 
has suffered as a consequence of the subject accident. It would, indeed, award Claimant a 
windfall to require the payment of an additional 25%, over and above the 32% disability award 
that has already been paid, since that 32% rating represents impairment paid as disability, and 
Claimant has failed to demonstrate that he has suffered disability in excess of his impairment. 
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
DATED this __ rs~- day of-~~ __ , 2018. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
/;. 
, om.mission Sec~ ary 
., ✓1/, >♦, .~ ........ 
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